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Roughly seven years before an Olympic Games, the International Olympic Committee 
(IOC) accepts bids from countries to host an Olympics. Subsequently, the IOC determines and 
announces to the world who has won (and lost) the right to host. Contrary to prior evidence, we 
find the announcements do not affect the bidding countries’ stock markets. We complement prior 
studies by including additional, more recent, years of announcements, by investigating whether 
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The average costs of a Summer and Winter Olympic Games are $5.2 billion and $3.1 
billion, respectively, with some events’ price tags running well over $10 billion (Flyvbjerg, 
Stewart, and Budzier (2016)). Furthermore, they overrun their budgets by 156% on average. These 
costs have large and important implications for local governments hosting the games as most 
recently noted in the popular press regarding the 2016 Summer Olympics in Rio de Janeiro 
(Worstall (2016), Kennedy (2016)). 
In defense of such expenditures, boosters and governments argue the Olympics bring 
economic benefits to the community as well as jobs to the area. The argument for such large 
government outlays is often an ex-ante one put forth during the bidding process using 
macroeconomic multipliers or input-output models (Centre for South Australian Economic Studies 
and KPMG Peat Marwick (1993), Papanikos (1999)). However, ex-post academic studies provide 
evidence of only a small economic gain (Baade and Matheson (2016), Baumann, Engelhardt, and 
Matheson (2012)). 
To provide a better understanding of the effects of hosting the Olympics, and more 
specifically to weigh in on the debate on the benefits of hosting the Games, we test for whether 
the prospect of hosting the Olympics impacts a host country’s stock market. We evaluate this 
impact in the context of the International Olympic Committee’s (IOC) host city/country bidding 
process, where cities/countries submit bids and compete to host an Olympics, culminating in the 
IOC’s announcement of who has won (and lost) the right to host an Olympics. In our analysis, we 
conduct an “event study,” as described by MacKinlay (1997) among others, with the triggering 
“event” being the announcement by the International Olympic Committee. Our analysis examines 
market-level stock price data of the prospective host countries around the time of the IOC 
announcement to see if abnormally positive or negative returns occur around the time of the 
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announcement. Using the returns results, we can empirically test whether a host country’s stock 
market rises, and by extension, whether hosting the Olympics increases the profits of its 
companies and the wealth of its citizens, consistent with the typical economic arguments made in 
support of hosting an Olympics. 
The results provided below extend the current literature on the topic of IOC 
announcements on stock prices. Our results are in line with Berman, Brooks, and Davidson (2000) 
who use an event study approach to find no general impact of the announcement of the Sydney 
games on Australia. In contrast to the earlier study, Veraros, Kasimati, and Dawson (2004) find a 
positive impact of winning the bid for the summer 2004 Olympics on the Athens Stock Exchange 
using an event study approach. However, both early studies focus on a single event. In the literature 
looking at multiple announcements, in particular Dick and Wang (2010) and Mirman and Sharma 
(2010), they find statistically significant effects. The former study finds it for winners and the 
latter for losers of the bids. All the studies use standard parametric event study techniques in 
finding their effects. 
We extend the event study literature on the impact of IOC announcements by (i) adding 
additional data (through the Chinese win of the 2022 Winter Olympics bidding process), (ii) 
analyzing stock market effects prior to the announcements to check for leakage of the 
announcement, and (iii) running non-parametric tests in addition to the standard parametric tests. 
Although our study contains more data, larger windows of analysis, and more robust estimates, we 
find little to no impact of the IOC announcements on the stock exchanges of the host countries. In 
other words, our results are in line with Berman, Brooks, and Davidson (2000), but in general fail 
to replicate the remaining literature even when taking a larger, longer, and more varied look at the 
data. 
That being said, we see several rather large abnormal returns in the stock markets of 
5  
countries who either won or lost their bid to host the Olympics. However, only one was large 
enough to reject a hypothesis of no effect after controlling for the fact so many tests were run. To 
test for an aggregate effect, we run on the order of 150 tests across multiple event windows and 
using parametric and non-parametric approaches. We find only three could potentially reject the 
null at a 5% type 1 error threshold. Overall, given the event study approach, our results suggest a 
weak to non-existent effect that the IOC announcement affects a bidding country’s stock market. 
 
2. Model 
To test for whether the Olympics has an economic impact for the country who hosts the 
games, we analyze whether the Olympics increases profits of publicly traded companies in the 
host countries. To measure whether there is an impact on profits, we exploit the theory that stock 
prices increase in value when firms’ expected future profits increase. In other words, if firm ABC 
suddenly has an increase in expected future profits of $1 billion, then the value of the firm 
increases on the order of $1 billion, after adjusting for a variety of factors such as the discount rate 
of the future earnings. Given the theory, it is key to pinpoint when firms’ expected profits would 
likely increase as a result of hosting the Olympic games. If those times can be pinpointed, then 
measuring changes in the value of the firms in a host country, or their market capitalization as 
measured through their stock prices, provides evidence of an economic impact from hosting. In 
the case of the Olympic games, prior research suggests the point in time when companies are 
affected is when the IOC announces a country will host an Olympic games. It is at that point that 
firms can expect to be getting future business and profits from providing goods and services to the 
Games. As a result, we analyze the change in stock prices around the time of the IOC 
announcement. 
To put it differently, we are using the event study approach following Berman, Brooks, 
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and Davidson (2000), Veraros, Kasimati, and Dawson (2004), Dick and Wang (2010) and Mirman 
and Sharma (2010). 
 
2.1 Event and estimation window 
We take our notation and discussion of the event study model we use from MacKinlay 
(1997). In the context of event studies, our “event date” is the day of the IOC’s announcement of 
who won the bidding process and will host the Olympics. To ensure we do not miss the potential 
impact of the announcement, we analyze a battery of event windows around the event date, 
investigating whether the announcement could have affected the stock market prior to the 
announcement, around the announcement, and after the announcement. In particular, we investigate 
eight different event windows, [τ1, τ2], including [0,1], [0,2], [0,5], [0,9], [-2,2], [-5,5], [-5,-1], and 
[-2,-1] where t = 0 is the day of the announcement, τ1 is the start of the event window, and τ2 is the 
end of the window being analyzed. The days are counted as the change relative to the previous day 
and all windows are inclusive. 
We analyze a wide range of windows for a variety of reasons. First, we are attempting to 
replicate previous studies. As a result, we include their windows. In particular, Dick and Wang 
(2010) include [0,1], [0,2], [0,5], [0,9]. However, we fail to replicate their results. Therefore, we 
investigate windows that start prior to the announcement date, or [-2,2], [-5,5], which is fairly 
common in the literature where information may be leaked. For completeness, we also provide 
estimates for windows [-5,-1] and [-2,-1] to be able to consider pre and post announcement effects 
separately and to ensure the effect isn’t lost to changes in expectations right before the 
announcement. 
Whatever the window, the objective is to capture whether host countries had abnormal 
returns during these event windows. In other words, do we see a country’s stock market index, or a 
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country’s firms’ profits, increase unexpectedly around the time of the announcement?   Central to 
our analysis is the assumption that the news contained in the   IOC announcement is unexpected. 
Otherwise, the announcement would be priced into the market in advance of the announcement. 
However, as noted above, we utilize eight different event windows, to help in identifying and 
isolating market effects even when there is leakage of the otherwise unexpected announcement 
result. Furthermore, we note the announcements are often a surprise to the general public as 
documented in the news. Refer to Magnay (2011) and BBC (2013) for the Pyeongchang and Tokyo 
games, respectively. Note that in a scenario where a city is expected to win, such as Beijing’s 
winning bid for the 2022 Winter Olympics (Rauhala and Birnbaum (2015)), this would bias against 
finding a country-level stock market effect. 
To estimate what is normal, we estimate returns of a country’s stock market over an 
estimation window of −241 ≤ t ≤ −41. For comparability, we use the same estimation window as 
Dick and Wang (2010). All measures of t are trading days. 
 
2.2 Estimating abnormal returns 
In determining what is abnormal, we use the estimation window to calculate normal returns 
using a market model. Specifically, we use ordinary least squares (OLS) to estimate the linear 
relationship 
 Rit = αi + βiRmt + εit  (1) 
for each announcement date, or observation, “i”, where Rit is the one-day return on country “i’s” 
stock market. As noted above, “t” represents the date relative to the announcement. Rmt is the 
“market return” as measured by the MSCI World Index. All returns are calculated using closing 
prices. The estimated parameters from OLS are α̂ i, β̂i, and  by announcement “i.” Note in our 
context the country level index is the individual announcement return while the global market is 
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used as the overall market return. Normally, a country’s stock market index is used as the overall 
market return relative to a specific firm’s stock price return. 
Given the OLS estimates of the linear relationship and error by country and announcement, 
we estimate whether a stock market has experienced something abnormal by calculating the error in 
the linear prediction, or 
 	  (2) 
where  is the sample of abnormal returns for firm “i” on day “t.” 
Note the sample abnormal return for country “i’s” stock market, or , is calculated 
relative to the global market in period “t.” The market term controls for systemic risk. The abnormal 
returns are normally distributed given standard assumptions with a mean zero and variance σ2. The 
normality assumption will be used and then relaxed when testing for an effect of host 
announcements on stock market indices. 
 
2.3 Estimation of the cumulative abnormal return 
Our objective is to test the effect of the IOC host announcement on a bidder’s stock market. 
To increase the power of the test, we aggregate abnormal returns over several days and 
announcements. The cumulative abnormal returns by event is calculated as 
	 , 	  (3) 




where N is the total number of announcements/events and [τ1, τ2] is the event window. Under the 
standard assumptions as discussed in MacKinlay (1997) and elsewhere, the variance of the statistics 
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in equations 3 and 4 are estimated as 
var , 	 1  (5) 
var ,
1
	 1  (6) 
respectively.  
Again, as discussed in MacKinlay (1997) and elsewhere, the estimates can be normalized 








	~	 0,1  (8) 
 
under the hypothesis of a mean of zero. The hypothesis can be rejected with a specified level of 
confidence. These tests are referred to as parametric test statistics where normality and a constant 
variance in returns across time are assumed. These tests represent the standard event study approach 
to testing whether the announcements had an effect. If an effect had not occurred, then we would 
expect to fail to reject the null. However, if the null is rejected, then the alternative is the event had a 
positive or negative impact on stock prices. As a result, we are able to speculate that the abnormal 
return was due to the event, i.e., the IOC announcement increased or decreased the countries’ 
companies’ future profitability. 
To summarize, we are testing whether there are abnormal returns over the event window. We 
calculate abnormal returns using parameters from an estimation window. If the abnormal returns are 
large, then we hypothesize it is due to the announcements. In calculating each abnormal return, we 
aggregate over several days around the event to ensure the impact of the information is not lost due 
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. 
to timing. Furthermore, we aggregate across events to improve the power of the test. 
The above test for abnormal returns is a standard parametric approach, and is the approach 
followed in earlier work including Berman, Brooks, and Davidson (2000), Veraros, Kasimati, and 
Dawson (2004), Dick and Wang (2010) and Mirman and Sharma (2010). 
The potential issue with the standard approach described above is that it relies on several 
potentially incorrect assumptions. In particular, the data may not be normally distributed and the 
variance in the data may have changed between the estimation window and event window. As a 
result, we extend the prior literature by further analyzing our tests using two non-parametric tests. 
Specifically, we use a sign and sign rank test. 
The sign test tests whether more than half of the announcements result in a positive or 
negative abnormal return. In using the sign test, we are able to ignore the normality assumptions and 
variance estimate from the estimation window. We simply test whether the abnormal return is a 
“fair coin flip.” To run the test, we count the number of countries with a positive cumulative 
abnormal return, calling it N+, and the total number of announcements N. Again, following 




~	 0,1 	 (9) 
An issue with the sign test relates to the fact it does not account for the size of each effect. As a 
result, we further analyze the data using the Wilcoxon sign rank test. Specifically, we take the 
absolute values of all the cumulative abnormal returns, or , , and rank them. Let 
, , be the ranking and , ,  be the rank if the cumulative abnormal return is greater than zero 
and zero otherwise. Given the ranking, the test statistic is calculated as 
, , , 	 (10) 
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As before, the test statistic does not require an assumption about the normality of the 
abnormal returns or an estimate of the variance using the estimation window. Note, W ranges 
between 0, . Furthermore, if W is significantly large or small, then the test statistic rejects 
the null hypothesis that the average cumulative abnormal return, or CAR(τ1, τ2), is zero. For 





~	 0,1 	 (11) 
We only use the asymptotic results for the full sample of losers. Otherwise, the critical values 
must be determined through a counting process. We take the critical values of W for small N from 
Wilcoxon and Wilcox (1964). In other words, for a given type 1 error and N, which determine the 
low and high critical values CL and CH , if W < CL or CH < W, we then evaluate the null that the 
average cumulative abnormal return is zero. 
 
3. Data 
To run the event study, we require two types of data. Specifically, the analysis requires the 
IOC announcement dates as well as stock index data for each winning and losing country in the 
bidding process. 
To acquire the dates of the announcements as well as the winners and losers, Grasso, Mallon, 
and Heijmans (2015) provides information on an Olympics by Olympics basis. More recent 
winning bids can be found on the official Olympics.org website under each Olympics’ 
documentation. To ensure transparency, the complete lists of winners and losers, as well as the 
announcement dates, are provided in Tables 1 and 2. 
The stock data of the winners and losers comes from country stock market data for the days 
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εi 
-241 to +9 where the announcement date is t = 0. Data between -241 and -41 is used as the 
estimation window and the data between -5 and 9 is used for the event windows. To reiterate, the 
days are trading days. When available, the data was acquired from Yahoo Finance API. When 
unavailable on Yahoo Finance, the data was acquired through Thomson Reuters’ Datastream. Note 
several decisions had to be made regarding what index should be used to represent a country as 
multiple indices exist. For transparency, the list of indices used in the analysis is provided in Tables 




We analyze the results along several dimensions - parametrically and non-parametrically, 
winning and losing bids, and varying event size windows. To allow for replication, and because the 
number of events is relatively small, we provide the cumulative abnormal returns and associated 
error estimates, or ,  and , for winners and losers in Tables 3 and 4. 
 By dividing the cumulative abnormal returns by 1	 , one can see the number 
of standard deviations away from the mean a particular stock market had during a particular event 
window. The Canadian stock market during its 9/30/1981 winning bid saw a 4.3 standard deviation 
abnormal return during the event window τ1 = −2 and τ2 = −1. The next highest was the USA’s losing 
10/17/1986 bid with a 3.76 standard deviation abnormal return during the event window τ1 = −5 and 
τ2 = 5. However, this later event as well as several others with a z-statistic above 2.5 cannot be 
used to reject a null of no effect because of the large number of tests. In particular, one is not able to 
use these later individual cases to reject a null of no effect once a Bonferroni correction is made. 
However, the large shocks do suggest further analysis is necessary. 
Rather than looking at abnormal returns by announcement, we analyze the aggregate effect. 
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The results for the winners, first losers (those ranked in second place in the last round of the 
competition), and losers of the bidding process are in Tables 5-7. For the winning bids, the 
cumulative abnormal returns are generally positive post announcement. However, this is also true 
for the first losers and all losers with the exception of the summer games. In other words, if the 
analysis is aggregated and one ignores the distinction between summer and winter games, then it 
seems countries are positively impacted no matter the outcome. Furthermore, the impacts are 
relatively large at around 0.5% for post announcement windows. Note however that once the 
summer games are analyzed separately, the losers are generally negative and winners are generally 
positive. Although informative, this type of analysis ignores the statistical properties of the statistics. 
Relying on the statistical properties of the estimated average effects, we fail to reject that the 
cumulative abnormal return is different from zero for nearly every cumulative return, as determined 
by the test statistic described in Equation 8.  The top two average cumulative return test statistics are 
1.76 and 2.06 for the winners of the summer games when using the interval τ1 = 0 and τ2 = 1 and the 
losers of the winter games when using the interval τ1 = 0 and τ2 = 1, respectively. However, the 
latter would be expected to be negative. Furthermore, they aren’t particularly large. As in the 
individual test cases, any observed statistical significance across any of the tests must be weighted 
with the fact that so many tests are being run. 
Relative to the closest study, Dick and Wang (2010) (DW), the estimates of the variation of 
the cumulative abnormal returns are very similar. For instance, we find the standard deviation of the 
cumulative abnormal return for the winning countries to be the same (up to three decimal places) 
for both the summer and winter games. Our estimates for the losers are slightly smaller, or .003 
versus .004 in DW. What differentiates our results, i.e., we fail to reject a null of no effect, is our 
estimated impacts are significantly smaller. For instance, our estimated cumulative abnormal return 
for winning bids in the [0,1] event window is 0.0007 versus 0.011 in the case of DW. Therefore, our 
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results are consistent in terms of the variation in the data. However, the estimated cumulative 
abnormal return statistics do not coincide. Although our results are markedly different, we note the 
key difference is we have additional data and have potentially used different country stock market 
indexes. 
As our results run relatively contrary to prior evidence, in particular DW, we perform two 
additional non-parametric tests not in the previous literature. The results of our first non-parametric 
test, the sign test, are provided in Tables 8-10. For the winning bids, as in the CAR case, we find 
abnormal returns on average happened more than 50% of the time after the announcement date. 
However, only one provides sufficient evidence to support rejection at the 5% significance level 
following the statistic defined in equation 9. The only other test statistic above 2, and only slightly 
above, should arguably be the opposite sign, i.e., negative.  In particular, the winter Olympic losers 
for the [0, 1] event window are similar to the parametric results. On aggregate, the results show 
little to arguably no evidence regarding the idea that the IOC announcement has a statistically 
significant impact on stock markets. This is especially true after the consideration of implementing 
a Bonferroni correction for the number of tests being run. 
As our final non-parametric test, we run the Wilcoxon sign rank test described in equations 
10 and 11. The results are provided in Tables 11-13.  The only test statistic in the entire group to be 
outside of the critical values, based on a 5% type 1 error threshold, is the “all games” under the [0, 
2] event window. The remaining results fail to reject the null of no cumulative effect. 
 
5. Small country analysis 
 As a potential critique of the analysis, winning the Olympics bid can have a large monetary 
benefit to the country, but the effect could be small relative to the size of the country’s economy or 
stock market. As a result, our analysis might simply be trying to find a “needle in a haystack.” 
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Given this issue, we analyze the effect of the announcements conditional on the host country’s size. 
In other words, we control for how important the bid can be relative to the country’s stock market. 
We take two approaches to answer the critique. In the first, we follow the approach of Dick 
and Wang (2010) by analyzing the correlation between a country’s 0, 5) (and θ0(0, 5)) and its 
size using a simple linear regression, or 
 yi = β0 + β1 share of GDP + β2 Summer Games + εi, (12) 
As in Dick and Wang (2010), we focus on the winners and where the size variable is “taken 
as the percentage of the individual country GDP relative to the world GDP in the announcement 
year.” The GDP data was taken from the United States Department of Agriculture’s ERS 
International Macroeconomic Data Set. The results are in Table 14. As before, we fail to find any 
meaningful impact of the bid on a country’s stock market even when controlling for size. 
The second approach bifurcates the dataset into a group of the large cities and a set of the 
small cities as defined by the size of the cities hosting the games, where a “win” by a large city 
within a country might be viewed as a “win” for the country as a whole resulting in more extensive 
national stock market effects. Given this split, we re-run the parametric results. The results are 
provided in Table 15. As seen here and throughout the paper, the results fail to reject a null 
hypothesis of no announcement effect under any reasonable significance level with the exception of 
the [0,2] event window for the winners (as seen before). 
 
6. Difference in winners and losers 
As an additional robustness check of the results, we calculate the difference in the stock 
market returns between winners and losers using both the parametric and non-parametric 
approaches. In other words, we work to improve the power of the test under the assumption that 
winning the bid to host the Olympics would positively affect a country’s companies’ future profits 
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while it would hurt countries who lose the bidding process. 
Under standard assumptions, the difference in the cumulative abnormal returns, or the 
parametric approach, is estimated as 
, 	
1
1  (13) 
where L = 1 if observation i was a losing bid, and zero otherwise. Its estimated variance is 
var , 	
1
1  (14) 




	~	N 0,1  (15) 





~	N 0,1  (16) 
 
where N is the number of winners and losers,  is the number of winners with a positive abnormal  
return in the event window, and  is the number of losers with a negative abnormal return in the 
event window. 
The results of the difference between winners and losers are provided in Table 16 for the 
parametric test and Table 17 for the non-parametric test. Unlike before, none of the test results show 
a test statistic above 2. In other words, we fail to reject the hypothesis that the difference in the 
returns, which would be expected to be positive if a winning announcement was good and a losing 




Cities who host the Olympics spend substantial sums of public funds to prepare and host the 
event. Boosters and governments who bid to host the Olympics argue the economic benefits of 
hosting outweigh the costs.  However, the argument for such large government outlays is often an 
ex-ante one put forth during the bidding process using macroeconomic multipliers or input-output 
models. 
To analyze the actual benefits rather than predictions, researchers have used a variety of 
methods based on measured outcomes in the host city and country after the Olympics have taken 
place. We take one of these approaches by testing for the impact that hosting the games has on the 
profits of the firms in the host country. To test for an impact on firm profits, we follow the literature 
by using an “event study” approach. The event study approach measures stock prices right around 
the time of the IOC announcement of the winning bid, and if stock prices (expected profits) rise 
during that period, then researchers can conclude there are substantial economic profits for the 
country hosting the games. 
The literature we refer to and follow includes Veraros, Kasimati, and Dawson (2004), Dick 
and Wang (2010), and Mirman and Sharma (2010). In these studies, the researchers have found 
some statistically significant evidence that announcements impact stock markets, and by extension, 
hosting the Olympic games has an economic benefit. 
In following the earlier work, we have failed to find any statistically significant impact of 
the announcements on stock prices. In other words, we find that an argument for a positive 
economic impact from the Games cannot be justified using an event study approach. 
Given our findings run contrary to previous results, we have extended the event study 
approach along several dimensions. In particular, we have (i) used additional data, (ii) investigated 
a larger range of event windows (time around the announcement), (iii) tested for an effect using two 
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additional non-parametric tests in addition to the standard parametric tests, and (iv) considered the 
difference in impacts between winners and losers using both the parametric and non-parametric 
approaches. Furthermore, we have worked to make our findings transparent. In particular, we have 
provided the announcement dates, stock indexes used, and individual cumulative abnormal returns 
used in determining our findings. As a result, researchers can analyze and replicate our work. 
The debate regarding the economic benefits of the Olympics is important. As part of the 
debate, we hope our results provide a transparent and empirically driven analysis that informs the 
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Table 1: Data Description: Winning Bids 
 
Olympics Announcement Country Name Stock Index Source of Index 
Winter 1988 09/30/1981 Canada S&P/TSX Composite Yahoo Finance 
Summer 1988 09/30/1981 South Korea KOSPI Composite Thomson Reuters’ Datastream 
Winter 1992 10/17/1986 France CAC General Index Thomson Reuters’ Datastream 
Summer 1992 10/17/1986 Spain Madrid SE General (IGBM) Thomson Reuters’ Datastream 
Winter 1994 09/15/1988 Norway OSEBX.OL Yahoo Finance 
Summer 1996 09/18/1990 USA S&P 500 Yahoo Finance 
Winter 1998 06/15/1991 Japan Nikkei 225 Yahoo Finance 
Summer 2000 09/23/1993 Australia All Ordinaries Yahoo Finance 
Winter 2002 06/16/1995 USA S&P 500 Yahoo Finance 
Summer 2004 09/05/1997 Greece Athens Index Composite Yahoo Finance 
Winter 2006 06/19/1999 Italy FTSE MIB Index Yahoo Finance 
Summer 2008 07/13/2001 China SSE Composite Yahoo Finance 
Winter 2010 07/02/2003 Canada S&P/TSX Composite Yahoo Finance 
Summer 2012 07/06/2005 UK FTSE 100 Yahoo Finance 
Winter 2014 07/04/2007 Russia RSF EE MT (RUR) INDEX Thomson Reuters’ Datastream 
Summer 2016 10/02/2009 Brazil IBOVESPA Yahoo Finance 
Winter 2018 07/06/2011 South Korea KOSPI Composite Yahoo Finance 
Summer 2020 09/07/2013 Japan Nikkei 225 Yahoo Finance 





Table 2: Data Description: Losing Bids 
 
Olympics Announcement Country Name Stock Index Source of Index 
Winter 1988 09/30/1981 Sweden AFFARSVARLDEN GENERAL INDEX Thomson Reuters’ Datastream 
Winter 1988 09/30/1981 Italy ITALY-DS Market Thomson Reuters’ Datastream 
Summer 1988 09/30/1981 Japan NIKKEI 225 STOCK AVERAGE Thomson Reuters’ Datastream 
Winter 1992 10/17/1986 Sweden AFFARSVARLDEN GENERAL INDEX Thomson Reuters’ Datastream 
Winter 1992 10/17/1986 Norway OSEBX.OL Yahoo Finance 
Winter 1992 10/17/1986 Italy ITALY-DS Market Thomson Reuters’ Datastream 
Winter 1992 10/17/1986 USA S&P 500 Yahoo Finance 
Winter 1992 10/17/1986 Germany DAX 30 PERFORMANCE Thomson Reuters’ Datastream 
Summer 1992 10/17/1986 France CAC General Thomson Reuters’ Datastream 
Summer 1992 10/17/1986 Australia All Ordinaries Yahoo Finance 
Summer 1992 10/17/1986 UK FTSE 100 Yahoo Finance 
Summer 1992 10/17/1986 Netherlands AEX INDEX (AEX) DS-CALC Thomson Reuters’ Datastream 
Winter 1994 09/15/1988 Sweden AFFARSVARLDEN GENERAL INDEX Thomson Reuters’ Datastream 
Winter 1994 09/15/1988 USA S&P 500 Yahoo Finance 
Summer 1996 09/18/1990 Greece Athens Composite Index Yahoo Finance 
Summer 1996 09/18/1990 Canada S&P/TSX Composite Yahoo Finance 
Summer 1996 09/18/1990 Australia All Ordinaries Yahoo Finance 
Summer 1996 09/18/1990 UK FTSE 100 Yahoo Finance 
Winter 1998 06/15/1991 USA S&P 500 Yahoo Finance 
Winter 1998 06/15/1991 Sweden AFFARSVARLDEN GENERAL INDEX Thomson Reuters’ Datastream 
Winter 1998 06/15/1991 Spain IBEX 35 Yahoo Finance 
Winter 1998 06/15/1991 Italy ITALY-DS Market Thomson Reuters’ Datastream 
Summer 2000 09/23/1993 China SSE Composite Yahoo Finance 
Summer 2000 09/23/1993 UK FTSE 100 Yahoo Finance 
Summer 2000 09/23/1993 Germany Dax Yahoo Finance 
Summer 2000 09/23/1993 Turkey BIST NATIONAL 100 Thomson Reuters’ Datastream 
Winter 2002 06/16/1995 Switzerland Swiss Market Index Thomson Reuters’ Datastream 
Winter 2002 06/16/1995 Sweden AFFARSVARLDEN GENERAL INDEX Thomson Reuters’ Datastream 
Winter 2002 06/16/1995 Canada S&P/TSX Composite Yahoo Finance 
Summer 2004 09/05/1997 Italy ITALY-DS Market Thomson Reuters’ Datastream 
Summer 2004 09/05/1997 South Africa FTSE/JSE ALL SHARE Thomson Reuters’ Datastream 
Summer 2004 09/05/1997 Sweden AFFARSVARLDEN GENERAL INDEX Thomson Reuters’ Datastream 
Summer 2004 09/05/1997 Argentina ARGENTINA MERVAL Thomson Reuters’ Datastream 
Winter 2006 06/19/1999 Switzerland Swiss Market Index Yahoo Finance 
Winter 2006 06/19/1999 Finland OMX HELSINKI (OMXH) Thomson Reuters’ Datastream 
Winter 2006 06/19/1999 Austria ATX Yahoo Finance 
Winter 2006 06/19/1999 Slovakia SLOVAKIA SAX 16 Thomson Reuters’ Datastream 
Winter 2006 06/19/1999 Poland WARSAW GENERAL INDEX 20 Thomson Reuters’ Datastream 
Summer 2008 07/13/2001 Canada S&P/TSX Composite Yahoo Finance 
Summer 2008 07/13/2001 France CAC 40 Yahoo Finance 
Summer 2008 07/13/2001 Turkey Borsa Istanbul 100 Yahoo Finance 
Summer 2008 07/13/2001 Japan NIKKEI 225 Yahoo Finance 
Winter 2010 07/02/2003 South Korea KOSPI Yahoo Finance 
Winter 2010 07/02/2003 Austria ATX Yahoo Finance 
Summer 2012 07/06/2005 France CAC 40 Yahoo Finance 
Summer 2012 07/06/2005 Spain IBEX 35 Yahoo Finance 
Summer 2012 07/06/2005 USA S&P 500 Yahoo Finance 
Summer 2012 07/06/2005 Russia RSF EE MT (RUR) INDEX Thomson Reuters’ Datastream 
Winter 2014 07/04/2007 South Korea KOSPI Yahoo Finance 
Winter 2014 07/04/2007 Austria ATX Yahoo Finance 
Summer 2016 10/02/2009 Spain IBEX 35 Yahoo Finance 
Summer 2016 10/02/2009 Japan NIKKEI 225 Yahoo Finance 
Summer 2016 10/02/2009 USA S&P 500 Yahoo Finance 
Winter 2018 07/06/2011 Germany Dax Yahoo Finance 
Winter 2018 07/06/2011 France CAC 40 Yahoo Finance 
Summer 2020 09/07/2013 Turkey Borsa Istanbul 100 Yahoo Finance 
Summer 2020 09/07/2013 Spain IBEX 35 Yahoo Finance 
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Table 3: Cumulative Abnormal Returns by Country: Winning Bids 
 
 
   ,  
   τ1 = 0, τ1 = 0, τ1 = 0, τ1 = 0, τ1 = −2, τ1 = −5, τ1 = −5, τ1 = −2, 
Country Announcement  τ2 = 1 τ2 = 2 τ2 = 5 τ2 = 9 τ2 = 2 τ2 = 5 τ2 = −1 τ2 = −1 
Canada 09/30/1981 0.0064 0.0035 0.0108 -0.0066 -0.0142 0.0498 -1.0135 -0.0069 0.0390 
South Korea 09/30/1981 0.0135 -0.0238 0.0073 0.0522 -0.0137 -0.0141 -0.0072 -0.0594 -0.0214 
France 10/17/1986 0.0134 -0.0326 -0.0332 0.0064 -0.0083 -0.0648 -0.03 -0.0364 -0.0317 
Spain 10/17/1986 0.0135 -0.0178 -0.026 -0.0518 -0.12 -0.0327 -0.0676 -0.0158 -0.0068 
Norway 09/15/1988 0.0203 0.0264 0.0321 0.0405 0.0371 0.0431 0.0542 0.0137 0.0111 
USA 09/18/1990 0.0081 0.0088 0.0025 0.0041 0.0354 0.0048 -0.001 -0.0052 0.0023 
Japan 06/15/1991 0.0138 0.0026 -0.0104 -0.0114 -0.0154 0.0029 0.0001 0.0114 0.0133 
Australia 09/23/1993 0.0074 0.0118 0.0079 0.0158 0.0365 0.0058 0.0237 0.0078 -0.0021 
USA 06/16/1995 0.0048 0.0102 0.0093 0.01 0.008 0.0085 0.0182 0.0081 -0.0009 
Greece 09/05/1997 0.0176 0.0742 0.0861 0.0614 0.0663 0.0756 0.0428 -0.0186 -0.0105 
Italy 06/19/1999 0.0154 -0.0023 0.0072 -0.0022 -0.0319 0.0056 -0.014 -0.0118 -0.0016 
China 07/13/2001 0.0089 -0.0096 -0.0123 0.0049 -0.0369 -0.0232 -0.0044 -0.0093 -0.0109 
Canada 07/02/2003 0.0064 -0.0054 -0.0038 0.0049 0.0057 -0.0036 0.0057 0.0008 0.0002 
UK 07/06/2005 0.0046 -0.0033 0.0051 -0.0002 -0.0106 0.0082 0.019 0.0191 0.0031 
Russia 07/04/2007 0.0135 0.0118 0.0122 0.0198 0.0322 0.0167 0.0162 -0.0036 0.0045 
Brazil 10/02/2009 0.018 0.0317 0.0126 0.0132 0.0315 0.0219 0.0362 0.0231 0.0093 
South Korea 07/06/2011 0.0081 0.0054 0.0076 -0.0106 -0.0117 0.0224 0.0172 0.0278 0.0149 
Japan 09/07/2013 0.0161 0.0236 0.0187 0.0049 0.0213 -0.0022 0.0153 0.0104 -0.0209 
China 07/31/2015 0.0168 -0.0306 0.0019 -0.0123 0.027 0.0046 -0.1387 -0.1264 0.0028 
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Table 4: Cumulative Abnormal Returns by Country: Losing Bids 
,  
ˆ 
τ1 = 0, τ1 = 0, τ1 = 0, τ1 = 0, τ1 = −2, τ1 = −5, τ1 = −5, τ1 = −2, 
Country Name Announcement 
 τ2 = 1 τ2 = 2 τ2 = 5 τ2 = 9 τ2 = 2 τ2 = 5 τ2 = −1 τ2 = −1 























Japan 09/30/1981 0.0056 -0.0001 -0.0025 0.0128 0.0147 -0.006 -0.0003 -0.013 -0.0035 
Sweden 10/17/1986 0.0116 -0.0033 -0.0153 -0.0063 0.0059 -0.028 -0.0404 -0.0341 -0.0127 
Norway 10/17/1986 0.0097 0.0112 0.0103 0.0083 0.0061 -0.0003 0.0142 0.006 -0.0106 
Italy 10/17/1986 0.0199 0.0107 0.0105 -0.0057 -0.0381 0.0204 0.012 0.0176 0.01 
USA 10/17/1986 0.0055 0.0032 0.012 0.0401 0.0383 0.0345 0.0684 0.0283 0.0225 
Germany 10/17/1986 0.0141 -0.014 -0.0034 0.0165 -0.0048 -0.0112 0.0049 -0.0116 -0.0078 
France 10/17/1986 0.0134 -0.0326 -0.0332 0.0064 -0.0083 -0.0648 -0.03 -0.0364 -0.0317 
Australia 10/17/1986 0.0085 0.0047 0.0124 0.0031 0.0027 0.0134 0.0116 0.0084 0.001 
UK 10/17/1986 0.0079 -0.0006 0.0045 0.0042 0.0161 0.0146 0.0078 0.0036 0.0101 
Netherlands 10/17/1986 0.0091 0.0009 0.005 0.014 0.0045 0.0105 -0.003 -0.0171 0.0055 
Sweden 09/15/1988 0.0148 -0.0049 0.0053 0.0345 0.0205 0.0057 0.0458 0.0113 0.0004 
USA 09/15/1988 0.0172 0.0009 -0.0057 0.0056 -0.0021 0.0009 0.0123 0.0068 0.0066 
Greece 09/18/1990 0.0244 -0.0576 -0.0605 -0.1483 -0.2289 -0.0049 -0.1545 -0.0063 0.0556 
Canada 09/18/1990 0.0056 0.0138 0.0151 0.0095 0.0094 0.0192 0.0098 0.0003 0.004 
Australia 09/18/1990 0.0095 -0.0072 -0.0026 -0.0295 -0.026 -0.0096 -0.0368 -0.0073 -0.007 
UK 09/18/1990 0.008 -0.0041 -0.0202 -0.0199 0.0031 -0.032 -0.04 -0.0201 -0.0118 
USA 06/15/1991 0.0087 -0.0027 -0.0058 -0.0156 -0.0111 0.002 -0.0083 0.0072 0.0078 
Sweden 06/15/1991 0.0122 0.0236 0.0347 0.0373 0.0476 0.0239 0.0373 0.0000 -0.0109 
Spain 06/15/1991 0.0132 -0.0051 -0.0132 -0.0056 -0.0049 -0.0486 -0.0333 -0.0276 -0.0354 
Italy 06/15/1991 0.0115 0.0239 0.0189 -0.0198 0.0018 0.0108 -0.0123 0.0075 -0.0081 
China 09/23/1993 0.0502 -0.0092 -0.0097 -0.0004 -0.0252 0.0091 0.0221 0.0225 0.0188 
UK 09/23/1993 0.0061 -0.002 0.0029 0.0059 0.0201 0.0073 0.0182 0.0123 0.0044 
Germany 09/23/1993 0.0079 -0.0066 0.0048 0.0032 0.0314 -0.0052 0.0198 0.0166 -0.0101 
Turkey 09/23/1993 0.0246 0.0286 0.0507 0.0153 0.0493 0.0566 0.0183 0.003 0.0059 
Switzerland 06/16/1995 0.0077 -0.0015 -0.0005 0.0066 0.0161 -0.0021 0.0052 -0.0014 -0.0015 
Sweden 06/16/1995 0.0079 0.0109 0.0138 0.0188 0.0291 0.0019 0.01 -0.0088 -0.0119 
Canada 06/16/1995 0.0047 0.0058 0.0025 -0.0046 -0.0002 0.0063 0.005 0.0096 0.0038 
Italy 09/05/1997 0.0101 0.004 -0.0032 -0.0181 0.0153 -0.0105 0.0071 0.0252 -0.0073 
South Africa 09/05/1997 0.0056 0.0056 -0.0015 -0.025 -0.0274 0.0063 -0.0323 -0.0073 0.0077 
Sweden 09/05/1997 0.0079 -0.0005 0.0045 -0.0152 -0.0004 -0.0157 -0.0196 -0.0044 -0.0202 
Argentina 09/05/1997 0.0106 -0.0057 -0.011 -0.0179 -0.0359 -0.0147 -0.0758 -0.0579 -0.0037 
Switzerland 06/19/1999 0.0137 0.0008 -0.003 -0.017 -0.0132 0.0001 -0.0148 0.0022 0.0031 
Finland 06/19/1999 0.0187 0.0374 0.0278 0.0111 0.0252 0.0267 0.0098 -0.0014 -0.0011 
Austria 06/19/1999 0.0148 0.0223 0.0205 0.0065 0.0328 0.0209 0.0047 -0.0018 0.0004 
Slovakia 06/19/1999 0.0161 0.0072 0.0134 -0.0143 -0.026 0.0175 -0.0452 -0.0309 0.0041 
Poland 06/19/1999 0.0264 0.0109 0.0082 0.036 0.0008 0.024 0.0402 0.0041 0.0158 
Canada 07/13/2001 0.0117 -0.0016 -0.0065 0.0091 0.0082 -0.0077 0.002 -0.007 -0.0012 
France 07/13/2001 0.0101 0.0143 0.0051 -0.0172 -0.0162 -0.0084 -0.0416 -0.0244 -0.0135 
Turkey 07/13/2001 0.0444 -0.0038 -0.0485 0.057 0.0803 -0.0953 -0.1416 -0.1986 -0.0468 
Japan 07/13/2001 0.0158 -0.0029 -0.0199 -0.0585 -0.0435 -0.0152 -0.0673 -0.0088 0.0047 
South Korea 07/02/2003 0.0203 0.0169 0.0281 0.0462 0.0634 0.027 0.0699 0.0237 -0.0012 
Austria 07/02/2003 0.0089 0.0061 0.0103 0.008 0.0189 0.0087 0.0124 0.0044 -0.0016 
France 07/06/2005 0.0061 -0.0033 0.0078 0.0082 0.025 0.001 0.0228 0.0146 -0.0068 
Spain 07/06/2005 0.0058 -0.0136 -0.0054 -0.0003 0.0077 -0.0108 0.0116 0.0119 -0.0054 
USA 07/06/2005 0.0037 0.0011 0.0015 -0.0029 0.0007 0.0098 0.0047 0.0075 0.0082 
Russia 07/06/2005 0.0141 0.0269 0.0358 0.0366 0.0201 0.0415 0.0663 0.0297 0.0057 
South Korea 07/04/2007 0.0079 0.0229 0.0265 0.0443 0.0553 0.0508 0.0579 0.0135 0.0243 
Austria 07/04/2007 0.0079 0.0056 0.008 -0.0091 -0.0276 -0.0008 -0.0156 -0.0066 -0.0088 
Spain 10/02/2009 0.0133 0.0051 0.0103 -0.01 -0.0212 -0.0008 -0.0101 -0.0001 -0.0111 
Japan 10/02/2009 0.0278 -0.0309 -0.0434 -0.0237 -0.009 -0.0428 -0.07 -0.0464 0.0006 
USA 10/02/2009 0.0115 0.0137 0.0058 0.0052 0.0045 0.0004 0.0078 0.0026 -0.0054 
Germany 07/06/2011 0.0054 -0.0005 -0.0031 -0.0048 -0.0126 -0.002 -0.005 -0.0002 0.001 
France 07/06/2011 0.0054 -0.0041 -0.0123 -0.0218 -0.0423 -0.0201 -0.0299 -0.008 -0.0078 
Turkey 09/07/2013 0.0159 0.0528 0.0494 0.0783 0.1178 0.0504 0.0763 -0.002 0.001 




Table 5: Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns: Winning Bids 
 
Event Window ([τ1, τ2]) [0,1] [0,2] [0,5] [0,9] [-2,2] [-5,5] [-5,-1] [-2,-1] 
All Games         
					  0.0045 0.0071 0.0075 0.0020 0.0068 -0.0015 -0.0090 -0.0003 
     St. dev.  0.0042 0.0051 0.0072 0.0093 0.0066 0.0098 0.0066 0.0042 
     Test statistic 1.0698 1.3988 1.044 0.2178 1.0337 -0.1507 -1.3671 -0.0788 
Summer Games         
					  0.0106 0.0113 0.0116 0.0011 0.0049 0.0063 -0.0053 -0.0064 
     St. dev.  0.0060 0.0074 0.0105 0.0135 0.0096 0.0142 0.0096 0.0060 
     Test statistic 1.7576 1.5309 1.1101 0.0813 0.5135 0.4444 -0.5569 -1.0630 
Winter Games         
					  -0.0011 0.0034 0.0039 0.0029 0.0085 -0.0085 -0.0123 0.0052 
     St. dev.  0.0058 0.0070 0.0100 0.0129 0.0091 0.0135 0.0091 0.0058 
     Test statistic -0.1889 0.4779 0.3874 0.2228 0.9369 -0.6272 -1.3546 0.8960 
 
 
Table 6: Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns: First Losing Bids 
 
Event Window ([τ1, τ2]) [0,1] [0,2] [0,5] [0,9] [-2,2] [-5,5] [-5,-1] [-2,-1] 
All Games         
					  0.0007 0.0012 0.0044 0.0051 0.0015 0.005 0.0006 0.0003 
     St. dev.  0.0057 0.0069 0.0098 0.0127 0.009 0.0133 0.009 0.0057 
     Test statistic 0.1204 0.1758 0.4438 0.4008 0.1693 0.3732 0.0673 0.0523 
Summer Games         
					  -0.0047 -0.0053 -0.0069 -0.0114 -0.0038 -0.0072 -0.0003 0.0015 
     St. dev.  0.01 0.0122 0.0173 0.0223 0.0158 0.0234 0.0158 0.0100 
     Test statistic -0.4746 -0.4362 -0.3983 -0.5106 -0.2412 -0.3061 -0.0178 0.1529 
Winter Games         
					  0.0061 0.0078 0.0156 0.0216 0.0068 0.0171 0.0015 -0.0009 
     St. dev.  0.0054 0.0066 0.0094 0.0121 0.0085 0.0127 0.0085 0.0054 
     Test statistic 1.1299 1.1753 1.6684 1.7856 0.8012 1.3497 0.1743 -0.1726 
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Table 7: Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns: Losing Bids 
 
Event Window ([τ1, τ2]) [0,1] [0,2] [0,5] [0,9] [-2,2] [-5,5] [-5,-1] [-2,-1] 
All Games         
					  0.0035 0.0026 0.0013 0.0023 0.0007 -0.0032 -0.0045 -0.0019 
     St. dev.  0.0030 0.0036 0.0051 0.0066 0.0047 0.0069 0.0047 0.0030 
     Test statistic 1.1690 0.7085 0.2449 0.3472 0.1407 -0.4647 -0.9576 -0.6453 
Summer Games         
					  -0.0005 -0.0017 -0.0037 0.0002 -0.003 -0.0129 -0.0092 -0.0012 
     St. dev.  0.0044 0.0054 0.0077 0.0099 0.007 0.0104 0.007 0.0044 
     Test statistic -0.1125 -0.3196 -0.478 0.0168 -0.4212 -1.2379 -1.3126 -0.2747 
Winter Games         
					  0.0079 0.0074 0.0067 0.0047 0.0047 0.0075 0.0008 -0.0027 
     St. dev.  0.0038 0.0047 0.0066 0.0085 0.006 0.0089 0.006 0.0038 
     Test statistic 2.0600 1.5743 1.0206 0.5466 0.7765 0.844 0.1339 -0.7004 
 
Table 8:  Non-Parametric Sign Test:  Winning Bids 
 
Event Window ([τ1, τ2]) [0,1] [0,2] [0,5] [0,9] [-2,2] [-5,5] [-5,-1] [-2,-1] 
All Games         
     Positive Abnormal Return (N+/N) 0.58 0.74 0.63 0.53 0.68 0.58 0.47 0.53 
     Test statistic (θ1) 0.69 2.06 1.15 0.23 1.61 0.69 -0.23 0.23 
Summer Games         
     Positive Abnormal Return (N+/N) 0.56 0.78 0.78 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.44 0.33 
     Test statistic (θ1) 0.33 1.67 1.67 0.33 0.33 0.33 -0.33 -1.00 
Winter Games         
     Positive Abnormal Return (N+/N) 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.7 





Table 9:  Non-Parametric Sign Test:  First Losing Bids 
 
Event Window ([τ1, τ2]) [0,1] [0,2] [0,5] [0,9] [-2,2] [-5,5] [-5,-1] [-2,-1] 
All Games         
     Positive Abnormal Return (N+/N) 0.44 0.44 0.61 0.61 0.50 0.56 0.44 0.44 
     Test statistic (θ1) -0.47 -0.47 0.94 0.94 0.00 0.47 -0.47 -0.47 
Summer Games         
     Positive Abnormal Return (N+/N) 0.33 0.33 0.56 0.56 0.33 0.56 0.33 0.33 
     Test statistic (θ1) -1.00 -1.00 0.33 0.33 -1.00 0.33 -1.00 -1.00 
Winter Games         
     Positive Abnormal Return (N+/N) 0.56 0.56 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.56 0.56 0.56 
     Test statistic (θ1) 0.33 0.33 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.33 0.33 0.33 
 
Table 10:  Non-Parametric Sign Test:  Losing Bids 
 
Event Window ([τ1, τ2]) [0,1] [0,2] [0,5] [0,9] [-2,2] [-5,5] [-5,-1] [-2,-1] 
All Games         
     Positive Abnormal Return (N+/N) 0.54 0.58 0.54 0.6 0.54 0.58 0.49 0.47 
     Test statistic (θ1) 0.66 1.19 0.66 1.46 0.66 1.19 -0.13 -0.4 
Summer Games         
     Positive Abnormal Return (N+/N) 0.4 0.5 0.53 0.63 0.47 0.53 0.47 0.5 
     Test statistic (θ1) -1.1 0 0.37 1.46 -0.37 0.37 -0.37 0 
Winter Games         
     Positive Abnormal Return (N+/N) 0.7 0.67 0.56 0.56 0.63 0.63 0.52 0.44 
     Test statistic (θ1) 2.12 1.73 0.58 0.58 1.35 1.35 0.19 -0.58 
 
Table 11:  Wilcoxian Sign Rank Test:  Winning Bids 
 
Event Window ([τ1, τ2]) [0,1] [0,2] [0,5] [0,9] [-2,2] [-5,5] [-5,-1] [-2,-1] 
All Games         
     W-statistic (θ2) 107 150 111 90 131 104 95 102 
     Critical Values (CL, CH)     (46,144)    
Summer Games         
     W-statistic (θ2) 21 38 33 24 26 20 19 20 
     Critical Values (CL, CH)     (6,39)    
Winter Games         
     W-statistic (θ2) 35 40 26 26 45 36 30 36 
     Critical Values (CL, CH)     (8,47)    
Critical values are determined by a two-sided test with a type 1 error threshold of 5%. The critical values are from Wilcoxon and 




Table 12:  Wilcoxian Sign Rank Test:  First Losing Bids 
 
Event Window ([τ1, τ2]) [0,1] [0,2] [0,5] [0,9] [-2,2] [-5,5] [-5,-1] [-2,-1] 
All Games         
     W-statistic (θ2) 60 56 96 92 89 85 59 81 
     Critical Values (CL, CH)     (40,131)    
Summer Games         
     W-statistic (θ2) 13 12 27 28 14 26 9 13 
     Critical Values (CL, CH)     (6,39)    
Winter Games         
     W-statistic (θ2) 18 16 23 21 31 19 22 28 
     Critical Values (CL, CH)     (6,39)    
Critical values are determined by a two-sided test with a type 1 error threshold of 5%. The critical values are from Wilcoxon and 




Table 13:  Wilcoxian Sign Rank Test:  Losing Bids 
 
Event Window ([τ1, τ2]) [0,1] [0,2] [0,5] [0,9] [-2,2] [-5,5] [-5,-1] [-2,-1] 
All Games         
     W-statistic (θ2) 738 898 897 995 892 1064 813 885 
     Critical Values (CL, CH)     (579.81,1073.19)    
Summer Games         
     W-statistic (θ2) 157 235 280 326 218 300 228 258 
     Critical Values (CL, CH)     (137,328)    
Winter Games         
     W-statistic (θ2) 218 215 176 190 232 244 183 190 
     Critical Values (CL, CH)     (107,271)    
Critical values are determined by a two-sided test with a type 1 error threshold of 5%. The critical values for the Summer and Winter 
games are from Wilcoxon and Wilcox (1964) with N equal to 30 and 27, respectively. The critical values for the All games case is 





Table 14:  Regression of Impact vs. Size 
 
 0,5  0,5  0,5  0,5  
Share of GDP -0.065 -0.06 -0.223 -0.062 
 (0.066) (0.064) (2.147) (2.186) 
Summer Games - -0.007 - -0.237 
 - (0.012) - (0.344) 
R2 0.035 0.055 0.000 0.028 
Note:  The regression run yi = β0 + β1 share of GDP + β2 Summer Games + ε1 where yi = 0,5 	, 0,5  for a bid of a 
particular host country in a particular year is represented by the subscript “i,” β0, β1, and β2 are estimated using OLS, and the 






Table 15: Small versus Large CAR Results 
 
Event Window ([τ1, τ2]) [0,1] [0,2] [0,5] [0,9] [-2,2] [-5,5] [-5,-1] [-2,-1] 
Winners:  Small Cities         
					  0.0025 -0.0032 -0.0025 -0.0060 -0.0025 -0.0014 0.0012 0.0006 
     St. dev.  0.0062 0.0075 0.0107 0.0138 0.0097 0.0145 0.0097 0.0062 
     Test statistic 0.4087 -0.4185 -0.2372 -0.4371 -0.2599 -0.0937 0.1209 0.1015 
Winners:  Large Cities         
					  0.0059 0.0146 0.0149 0.0079 0.0136 -0.0016 -0.0164 -0.0010 
     St. dev.  0.0060 0.0074 0.0105 0.0135 0.0096 0.0142 0.0096 0.0060 
     Test statistic 1.7576 1.5309 1.1101 0.0813 0.5135 0.4444 -0.5569 -1.0630 
Losers:  Small Cities         
					  0.0041 0.0021 -0.0011 -0.0038 0.0023 0.0027 0.0037 0.0002 
     St. dev.  0.0043 0.0053 0.0074 0.0096 0.0068 0.0101 0.0068 0.0043 
     Test statistic 0.9477 0.4005 -0.1412 -0.3910 0.3435 0.2650 0.5477 0.0526 
Losers:  Large Cities         
					  0.0031 0.0028 0.0026 0.0058 -0.0003 -0.0067 -0.0093 -0.0032 
     St. dev.  0.0040 0.0048 0.0069 0.0088 0.0063 0.0093 0.0063 0.0040 
     Test statistic 0.7836 0.5850 0.3792 0.6586 -0.0510 -0.7179 -1.4803 -0.7971 
Note: In performing the Large vs. Small City analysis, the host cities associated with each country’s Olympic bid were identified and 
were sorted into either the large or small group based on the size of the city’s metropolitan area or national capital status. Notably, 
rather than pooling summer and winter Olympics bids together and using a single large/small cut-off, we utilized one cut-off for 
Summer Olympics bids and one cut-off for Winter Olympics bids. Because Summer Olympics tend to be held in large cities and 
Winter Olympics tend to be held in remote (small) hamlets, not utilizing different cut-offs for summer and winter Olympics would 
have resulted in the summer bids clustering in the large city group and winter bids clustering in the small city group. For the Summer 
Olympics, bidding cities that were the largest metropolitan area in the respective country or were the national capital were treated as 
“Large” - all other cities were treated as “Small,” resulting in 27 large cities and 12 small cities. For the Winter Olympics, bidding 
cities that were among the largest 25 metropolitan areas in the respective country were treated as “Large” - all other cities were 
treated as “Small,” resulting in 20 large cities and 17 small cities. For transparency, the large bids are defined as Buenos Aires 
(Argentina), Sydney (Australia), Klagenfurt (Austria), Salzburg (Austria), Calgary (Canada), Quebec City (Canada), Toronto 
(Canada), Vancouver (Canada), Beijing (China), Beijing (China), Helsinki (Finland), Paris (France), Berlin (Germany), Munich 
(Germany), Athens (Greece), Rome (Italy), Torino (Italy), Tokyo (Japan), Amsterdam (Netherlands), Lillehammer (Norway), 
Moscow (Russia), Poprad-Tatry (Slovakia), Seoul (South Korea), Madrid (Spain), Falun (Sweden), Ostersund (Sweden), Stockholm 
(Sweden), Sion (Switzerland), Istanbul (Turkey), London (UK), and New York (USA) while the small bids are defined as Brisbane 
(Australia), Melbourne (Australia), Rio (Brazil), Albertville (France), Annecy (France), Berchtesgaden (Germany), Aosta (Italy), 
Cortina d’Ampezzo (Italy), Nagano (Japan), Nagoya (Japan), Osaka (Japan), Zakopane (Poland), Sochi (Russia), Cape Town (South 
Africa), Pyeongchang (South Korea), Barcelona (Spain), Jaca (Spain), Birmingham (UK), Manchester (UK), Atlanta (USA), 





Table 16: Difference in Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
 
Event Window ([τ1, τ2]) [0,1] [0,2] [0,5] [0,9] [-2,2] [-5,5] [-5,-1] [-2,-1] 
All Games         
					  -0.0015 -0.0001 0.0009 -0.0012 0.0012 0.0020 0.0011 0.0013 
     St. dev.  0.0025 0.0030 0.0042 0.0055 0.0039 0.0057 0.0039 0.0025 
     Test statistic -0.6033 -0.0466 0.2222 -0.2216 0.3121 0.3566 0.2855 0.5506 
Summer Games         
					  0.0028 0.0040 0.0055 0.0001 0.0034 0.0114 0.0059 -0.0005 
     St. dev.  0.0037 0.0045 0.0064 0.0083 0.0058 0.0087 0.0058 0.0037 
     Test statistic 0.7673 0.8735 0.8615 0.0151 0.5839 1.3141 1.0055 -0.1467 
Winter Games         
					  -0.0060 -0.0045 -0.0039 -0.0026 -0.0011 -0.0078 -0.0039 0.0033 
     St. dev.  0.0032 0.0039 0.0055 0.0071 0.0050 0.0075 0.0050 0.0032 
     Test statistic -1.8903 -1.1410 -0.7018 -0.3684 -0.2206 -1.0427 -0.7778 1.0486 
 
 
Table 17:  Difference in Returns with Non-Parametric Sign Test 
 
Event Window ([τ1, τ2]) [0,1] [0,2] [0,5] [0,9] [-2,2] [-5,5] [-5,-1] [-2,-1] 
All Games         
    Expected	Abnormal	Return	  0.49 0.50 0.50 0.43 0.51 0.46 0.50 0.53 
    Test statistic (θ4) -0.23 0.00 0.00 -1.15 0.23 -0.69 0.00 0.46 
Summer Games         
    Expected	Abnormal	Return	  0.59 0.56 0.54 0.41 0.54 0.49 0.51 0.46 
    Test statistic (θ4) 1.12 0.8 0.48 -1.12 0.48 -0.16 0.16 -0.48 
Winter Games         
    Expected	Abnormal	Return	  0.38 0.43 0.46 0.46 0.49 0.43 0.49 0.59 
    Test statistic (θ4) -1.48 -0.82 -0.49 -0.49 -0.16 -0.82 -0.16 1.15 
 
 
 
